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 Pollution has become a major cause of concern for large cities in most parts 
of the world giving rise to increased health costs. The thesis tries to study pollution 
taxes and how they are theoretically justified in being used as effective policy 
instruments. It tries to analyze the general theoretical construction of the 
externality tax and proposes certain revisions that planners can consult. The control 
of fuel markets is linked to such pollution and allowing reform will reduce such 
inefficiency and externality costs through the free market mechanism. Also, the 
constitutional framework for putting together this reform is entirely based on the 
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 Air quality in large urban settlements is often found to be below optimal 
levels or what is defined as harmful to its population. City councils work toward 
achieving cleaner air so as to avoid the detrimental health effects from the presence 
of pollutants in the atmosphere. Such public bads are produced from the 
consumption of commodities that include an externality. The thesis examines the 
case of transportation fuel consumed by citizens which is a main contributor to such 
pollution. The task of controlling single or even groups of large industrial polluters 
has a growing extent of literature that can be consulted for answers. Very often such 
commodities that are consumed by a large cross section of the population are taxed 
to control the level of such public bads. This thesis makes an attempt to look at the 
construction and working of such a tax as an instrument of public policy. It ventures 
beyond the ideas of bargaining and contracts which are thrown up intrinsically in 
certain situations. After all, the very concept of intervention is to intervene, such 
that the discrepancy, which causes the intervention in the first place, is resolved. 
Bargaining is best without a trace of doubt, but non-universal as its assumptions are 
usually hard to find in reality and particularly so in cities with large populations 
which are difficult to organize into groups. 
 
 The naive question is thus - what is the extent of this intervention, so that it 
resolves and does not exacerbate the problem further. A helpful aide in this fray is 
that this public bad must be done away with as quickly as possible all over, leaving 
planners with imperfect information and ineffective administrative abilities better 
off not having to deal with inter-temporal and inter-spatial tradeoffs. If either one or 
both these conditions are present, then the public bad needs a more sophisticated 
analysis. The thesis also avoids the idea of strict substitution and technologies being 
used currently are assumed to have a lock-in effect. Another thought that must be 
harbored throughout the analysis is that such external costs are merely accounted 




 What this thesis intends to do is to revisit the externality or green tax (the 
terms will be used interchangeably to avoid the mundane and cause some 
distraction) and examine the framework on which it is built. The effort is not to 
defeat or undermine preconceived notions, but more along the lines of 
reinvigorating and reconstructing what is considered an effective policy instrument 
as we check it for deficiencies. It tries to enrich and bring about some color and 
texture to the fabric of an externality tax. How it can further be fine tuned to achieve 
maximum gains for society is another spillover. There are glaring empty spaces that 
one can stare into and find little, but the effort is to try and proceed with caution to 
see what happens when the green tax is implemented and what should’ve 
happened. Was it the right green tax and if yes, did it work, and if yes again, what 
made it. The tricky business with taxes is that it is difficult to know the right amount 
ex-ante, whereas the whole process of internalizing is best before the damage is 
done.  
 
 The thesis opens with a discussion on what lessons can be drawn from 
economic theory to deal with public bads. This is followed by a section on how 
markets with externality behave with price control or specifically subsidies. The 
next section then discusses a free market and how the elusive optima we seek 
through taxation is achieved or not. The green tax is then redefined and checked for 
efficiency followed by a section which discusses the constitutional arrangements for 











Lessons from theory 
  
 The price-quantity equilibrium is allowed to hold in this analysis ignoring the 
quality dimension, which is extremely important and if included can offer best 
insights. But for now, the analysis is limited. Information, competition and authority 
are assumed to be perfect for no reason other than easing the constraints of the 
problem. Au contraire, this does not really generalize or trivialize the discussion for 
even imperfections tend to affect all the control variables and not some specific 
ones. Making Pareto improvements from a utilitarian perspective is the biggest 
sticky note, and quite tricky to define correctly, as is with a free market which is 
already on the efficiency frontier. Resorting to some form of lump sump 
compensation to restore surplus, the form of which is irrelevant is quite natural. It 
must be mentioned here that this is a direct consequence of the market mechanism 
and not a normative position, not that this thesis won’t tilt toward normative 
analysis at some juncture. 
 
 Taxes, as the thesis examines, can be distributed equally over markets, or 
markets can be distorted equally by unequal taxes. It calls for determining which 
ones are crucial, and which are not? Naturally, the crucial ones will in their interest 
resist high or even equal tax rates. The discussion is still working within a state 
versus market framework where the state has little interest in the market apart 
from taxation. In welfare terms, comparatively advantageous markets could be 
distorted less. Efficiency in terms of how the elasticity of a good determines the tax 
is irrelevant. This follows from the textbook definition of efficiency, which measures 
what is termed as a deadweight loss (the thesis also refers to it as a distortion) from 
price or quantity control, but it should not be used to propose such instruments 
unless the desired consequence justifies it. As an example of flawed central 
planning, it needs little elaboration. The bounds that construct such triangular 
inefficiency losses can be easily manipulated to show that price control in cases of 




  For example, the case of toll taxes on roads that are additional to what 
makes an optimal price for the rate of return on the investment or for avoiding 
congestion. The road would have to be narrowed down to accommodate the change 
in traffic when such taxes are levied. This is the case of a non-zero slack or a zero 
shadow price. But it is an interesting trail to follow if one is into the science of 
designing future transport networks. 
 
 The results from maximization of surplus in standard cases yield an additive 
tax that should reflect the relative price of a goods utility and its disutility across all 
consumers. While it is theoretically sound in its conclusions, it may or may not be 
accurate in its beginnings. This depends on how and in which context it has been 
created. The argument for driving innovation through constraints like taxes holds 
only when the agent in question feels the constraint, thus making the agent more 
critical than the constraint. Heavy taxation is not necessarily the mother of 
invention and neither is controlling prices below their optimal level. The theory of 
the second best where close attention must be paid to the relationship between the 
good in question and other goods that will be affected by a policy instrument leads 
well but delegates more authority than what planners usually deserve. The spillover 
effects from policy action can be accounted for better if the design is objective as 














Markets and price control 
 
 Price control as defined here will be the exogenous setting of the price level 
of a commodity that differs from what the aggregate demand-supply equilibrium 
would suggest. This is set by a state or a regulatory body with perfect authority and 
information. The underside to such price controls is again a market distortion with 
benefits being the avoidance of extreme macroeconomic scenarios such as high 
inflation. They are usually good instruments in times of economic and political 
volatility providing much needed reliability but considered to be stifling to 
economic growth in the long run. And in ordinary circumstances, it is quite natural 
to see that the only way such prices can be rigidly maintained is for this state to 
control the production and sale process or else a willing seller will find a willing 
buyer in spite of such regulations. But if this were not the case, then the state 
transfers to the seller the power to select buyers, which it does through habit or 
preference. And such controls are also most successful in imperfect markets with 
few players, making enforcement and the ability to ration easier. Most 
transportation fuel markets fit this definition. Price controls serve the state, the 
sellers and buyers, but do they serve the market.  
 
 However absurd that may sound, as the market is made up of buyers and 
sellers, it is of importance to us as to what it falls short of doing is allocating such 
resources efficiently, which a market is precisely meant for. The surplus required to 
maintain price controls, or subsidies more commonly, is met by placing the burden 
on other sectors of the economy. And consumer surplus being extraordinarily high 
when the market price of the good is under arbitrary control, gives little incentive to 
invest or innovate or expand such sectors. Lay men on a hunt would call this a 
sitting duck. So while such sectors do not expand naturally they do cause distortions 
to other sectors. The only plausible explanation of this is inefficient price control, 





 The equilibrium that exists in such situations is Pareto efficient but the 
distribution of resources is not. And what effect does this have on the externality? 
While society consumes more of this good, it also suffers higher costs of pollution.  
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 The above diagram, derived again from a (p, q) space, shows how the 
distributional efficiency varies with price controls where C, O and T indicate a price 
ceiling, the market price without tax and price after a green tax respectively. We also 
see that there are two points E and F, where price controls achieve maximum 
efficiency. Welfare has been superimposed in this space although it is not measured 
in the same units, an error, but done so only to facilitate comprehension. It must be 
mentioned that any movement both ways from O does not offer Pareto welfare gains 
but only internalizes costs, leaving the question of how they should be distributed, 
hence the above analysis. But if point C is a subsidy, then the welfare loss from such 
a transfer shows up through excessive environmental degradation. Increasing prices 
or moving toward O-T then offers Pareto improvements through a rise in 






The case of the missing optima 
 
 In this section, the idea is to try and analyze the behavior of tax rates and 
the impact of a simple tax on the free market. There are no major assumptions other 
than a market with demand, supply and an externality; all linear in their nature in 
terms of marginality (any other case is extreme and thus has easy and obvious 
solutions). In a simple {x, f(x)} representation in Euclidean space, the different 
marginal returns against the tax rate are plotted. A tax causes distortion, generates 
revenue and allows cost savings in terms of marginal damage from the externality. 
What then should be its optimal structure? A logical conclusion would be to have a 
tax that maximizes revenue and cost savings while minimizing distortion at the 
same time. Keeping this in mind it can be seen that – 
The welfare maximizing tax rate may not coincide with the revenue maximizing tax 
rate, with or without an externality.  
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A few points that explain the above illustration– 
 
a) Social benefits (SB) are a sum of revenue (R) and cost savings (CS), working 
within a welfare state wherever it is possible. 
b) Market distortion (MD), revenue and cost savings are measured as a function of 
the tax rate within their traditional definitions and derived from the (p,q) space 
c) X and Xe are the welfare maximizing tax rates without and with an externality and 
Z is the revenue maximizing tax rate 
d) Marginality obtains the maxima for the aggregate welfare   function W  
e) The incidence on market surplus is of a standard nature and does not interfere         
with the analysis, being again, a redistributive feature 
 
Let t be an arbitrary tax rate; 
Let mx be the slope of  the demand-supply-externality curve; 
Let cx be arbitrary constants of such curves; 
The point Z is obtained from maximizing R w.r.t t 
The point X is obtained from maximizing W = (R -MD) w.r.t t 


















The green tax rate may not be optimal or neutral for a wide range of elasticities and 
extent of the social damage as shown below.  
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                                  Optimal path 
                                                                                                           Elasticity<1 
 




marginal external cost - MEC 
 
The elasticity here is derived purely from the sum of producing and consuming the 
good, indicating a society’s valuation, technological capabilities and inertia, and kept 
basic for illustration. What this analysis does provide, is a theoretical revision of this 
tax. The tax as it does turn out, may be lower than necessary (as is the case for E<1 
and for E>1 with a minimum MEC) if it truly intends to maximize social welfare or 
otherwise. For ordinary cases, the standard tax being used is weak and could be 
ramped up.  
 
Let t1 be the standard tax rate; 
Let t2 be the optimal tax rate; 
Let mx be the relative slope of the demand-supply-externality function; 













To check for the relative magnitude of the two taxes, equate and solve to get; 
; 
 
X and K are now the tax rate and sum of elasticities respectively. 
The above function is depicted below in the two diagrams with K=1 being a critical 
point. 
The two cases are shown separately. 
 
(1) E < 1                 (2) E > 1 
          
 
The present situation would follow the first case, making the green tax weaker than 











The green tax   
  
 We have seen how the nature of an externality tax varies according to the 
nature of the state that is taxing the good and the external cost in the preceding 
section. We now try and study the standard green tax, where revenue is not a 
concern. A simple green tax is calculated from the intersection of marginal benefits 
and marginal social costs giving us a desired combination of (p, q). For every 
additional quantity, society as a ‘whole’ is worse off. However, there is another point 
(p*, q*), more and cheaper, where the marginal social cost equals the marginal 
distortion. Thus, the true tax should emerge from the intersection of the marginal 
social cost and the marginal distortion it produces. The point being that the cost 
savings may be distributed over a larger portion of the population than the market 
distortion. A is greater than B, but A/x may not be greater than B/y if x is much 
larger than y. This also follows from the fact that the tax is meant to correct the 
market and for no other purpose and that the  aggregate does not represent the 
individual.  
 
 What is generally thought to be a neutral tax must incorporate 
distributional efficiency (distribution here does not refer to how the tax impacts 
individual income groups but to the division of costs between the market in 
question and those affected from the externality) in addition to the assumed 
accountability it brings about. The green tax offers a combination of (p, q) for the 
benefit of society that may not maximize the interests of all. Its simplicity is its 
biggest strength and its biggest weakness. It sets an optimal level of pollution and 
then declares a fee. The correct way would be to approach the optimum level of 
pollution as the fee is levied. This is because it is difficult to really know what an 
optimal level is in the first place. The point where marginal benefits equal marginal 
social cost is not representative for the consumer at that point unlike the (p, q) 





 It is thus not the equilibrium, but tuned to look like one, what we call an 
apparent equilibrium, much like the concept of apparent depth for any optics 
enthusiast who happens to be reading this. This is even more so the case when 
quality is an additional dimension but we avoid the complexity. In other words, the 
tax proposed only to reduce the public bad, is heavy, if traditional analysis is 
pursued. The argument that the proposed green tax eliminates the alternative once 
the tax is decided such that no comparison can be sought between the two optima’s 
is strong but disappears as quickly as it is arises. A tax does not alter reality and the 
processes and events that are part of it, it only alters their distribution.  The entire 
concept is dependant on how many gain and how many lose from price controls. 
The more the numbers diverge, the more the need to revise the standard green tax. 
The diagram below tries to illustrate this point. 
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 marginal benefit 
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 M is market optimum and S is social optimum derived from imposing 
external costs on the marginal cost curve of producing the good. But there is a point 
B such that any apparent improvement toward M reveals social costs/y > market 
surplus/x ; and any improvement toward S reveals market distortion/x > social cost 
savings/y; where x is number of market participants and y is the total number of 
stakeholders, and x y, if the marginal benefits and external cost are not distributed 
over all market participants equally. For example, a cyclist suffers from pollution but 




The following calculations are of little practical significance but nevertheless 
interesting. The point B is where the social costs incurred equal market distortion;  
 
 





         ; 
 
          ; 
 





                  for m3=m2; 
 
         for c3=c2; 
 
 
 The external costs are assumed to be increasing but not radical. In cases 
where external costs escalate rapidly beyond a certain limit, regulation in the form 
of command and control is more useful as can be seen in a number of situations.  
This is most important for what the tax means to infra-marginal consumers, where 
the willingness to pay may be overshadowed by the ability to pay. The true tax is, in 
this case, obviously, lower than the proposed externality tax. If the market is society 
itself (x=y) or close to it, then the social optimum S holds as in a standard case but as 
x and y differ more from each other- large cities with many people who do not own 




 This is a classic public bad situation which needs a regulatory body for 
intervention and redistribution which becomes a normative issue for obvious 
reasons. In other cases, Point B, being a quadratic function of aggregate demand and 
supply, reduces to a simple arithmetic or geometric mean of the two optima’s, 
depending on the nature of the externality being a constant cost or an increasing 
cost function of the good, just for plain kicks. The second case would also mean that 
the tax is equal to the marginal external cost for all (P, Q) and not uniform. Non 
linear taxation is not unheard of. We have assumed that the commodity in question 
is not taxed apart from this particular environmental tax. Note that this result is in 
contrast to the one obtained above where the green tax is generally found to be 
below par. 
 
 The divergence of the results from the above two cases arises from the 
definition of the tax. Is it used in addition to a basic commodity tax or is it a solitary 
tool for a specific purpose? If it is additional, then the green tax is a little off-the-
mark in both directions but usually weak and if it is meant to check only the 
externality, then it is abstract and heavy. The former is a more realistic case but this 
optimal is difficult to achieve as the actions would again not be Pareto efficient. Few 
governments duly supported by producers, which is the state itself in most cases, 
would go ahead and increase tax rates if they are at the maxima because of 
environmental concerns in spite of it being in the greater interests of the people.  
The irony being that the dismal perception of a tax increase by citizens allows the 
state to sit pretty. The assumption that revenue is not a concern is where we go 
awry. It usually is. If the government is truly of, by and for the people, it is similar to 










 It is evident how markets may be inefficiently controlled and how the 
green tax may or may not be theoretically optimal and the reasons for being so. We 
now proceed to see whether the green tax is efficient and if not, why. We also study 
the effects of imperfect authority and competition.  
 
 Indirect market based instruments like the one we’re discussing here are 
set by planners in the best interest of society. The market price of fuel - diesel and 
gasoline, show a great degree of variation across different states with little 
correlation to income although richer states have relatively higher taxes and 
eventually higher prices, but the direction of causality is difficult to underline. Can 
they afford high taxes or is it a purposeful ethic. Such questions are difficult to 
answer in a generalized fashion as each state is a unit of its own. Certain relatively 
poorer states also manipulate the price of fuel by placing a premium but most of 
them subsidize it. Some states go as far as manipulating the quality of the good in 
the market by imposing taxes on the initial purchases of motor vehicles and its 
technical specifications; clearly driving its population into what it feels is the right 
car. This again reminds us that fuel consumption by consumers and the externality 
cost is mostly a matter of public policy. The concept of political feasibility then plays 
an important role into who gets what and why. 
 
  The state assumed is endowed with perfect information and authority in 
the previous section with perfect competition in the market. But it could be that the 
above tax rate will further will be influenced by monopolies or lobbies causing 
further disturbance to the optima. The authority of the state is then compromised. 
Competition and authority go hand in hand. A state loses credibility when it 






 Price controls result in inefficient allocation but further examination of 
what happens when one stakeholder has an advantage over others is useful. The 
shifting of welfare surplus from buyers to sellers or vice-versa is attached to 
organization – or the cohesion of many into one. For states where consumer surplus 
is high, any shock to this equilibrium will obviously result in unrest. For a monopoly, 
the externality cost is low but only at the expense of the market. The good is not 
adequately provided and poor in quality. There is no escaping the transparency and 
accountability that a free market offers by keeping stakeholders from colluding. 
 
 This would suggest that another set of institutions, apart from the taxing 
body, be created to check for deviations when we don’t have conditions for perfect 
competition and authority. In other words, the presence of non–discriminatory laws 
and their enforcement in a society may be required when the taxing body is not free 
from interference, from the multitude or the monopolist. This could go on and on 
forming a closed loop (which only an exogenous shock can redefine into the free 
flowing atomistic state, which is even more costly as history teaches us) because 
this new institution must again be objective. The existence of rational expectations 
from these new institutions when the body that should function objectively in the 
first place is not doing so is truly a tough knot to untie and this thesis in not meant 
for that purpose.  
 
 It can be safely concluded that taxation becomes costly in situations 
where objectivity is not coveted than where it is. The free market and the objectivity 
of the state cannot be separated. To simplify, what is considered as politically 
feasible is entirely the prerogative of the state and its people. If it is objective, then 
the market works, if it is not, then it doesn’t. This does not imply the absence of the 
state or the absence of planning, but merely the absence of bias. What makes the 
rule of law immune from the same plague that affects planning is a tough question 
to answer because rent seeking feeds on power seeking, and reaches the source of 
authority, be it a minister or a bureaucrat. There isn’t any further need to elaborate 




 The delivery of objectivity requires a state, whose form is again 
irrelevant. It could be a set of reasonable laws, social contracts and tacit norms, or it 
could be a benevolent planner. On how to diffuse objectivity such that markets 
which reflect willingness to pay begin to function properly is to dive into culture and 
philosophy, alterable through education and learning, and that is that.  
  
 Returning to the efficiency of pollution control, a combination of 
instruments, technical control and taxation, has proven to be most useful as far as 
comparing a set of alternatives goes. There is also evidence that the externality tax 
has performed cost effectively as compared to other direct instruments like 
command and control. That leaves us little to choose from, the only difference being 
that the externality tax will perform better than its alternatives when the state is not 
benevolent, but at its best when it is. The reasons are the flexible response that it 
faces and sound planning, respectively. Abatement does become a cheaper exercise 
when a tax is levied over the regular options of implementing standards. The cost of 
implementing the tax which we have ignored so far could further reduce its efficacy. 
But this is universal such that monitoring and administration costs are to be found 
in all states. Implementation is not related to principle. It has a lot to do with 
acquiring skills from discipline and training. 
 
 Revaluing social benefits could also be done by imposing costs of 
externality on marginal benefits as compared to imposing it on the costs of 
producing it. This can also be achieved by altering valuation amongst citizens by 
social awareness programs, the media and education. All of this does need a choice 
mechanism that explains how the state will plan such that the market is efficient, 










 Some general ideas we derive from the essay are summarized in this 
section. The costs of an externality are merely to be distributed between 
stakeholders, through the best way of measuring willingness to pay.  A market is 
well suited to solving this problem, making public policy an integral exogenous part 
of this system to carry out this function. When such markets are controlled or 
subsidized, it is done so in the best interests of the stakeholders who control such 
prices while incurring large costs through the externality. A revenue maximizing 
government may under tax a public bad if it is a serious one, and may overtax a 
potentially trivial one.  In any other case, the result may be optimal, albeit that the 
desired outcome was not planned but unknowingly occurs. The difficulty here could 
be with trying to achieve the Pareto point, which does need the increasing return 
axiom to hold. The standard externality tax may be theoretically questionable as it is 
directly imposed on the private costs of supplying the good, in spite of it being 
marginally different for the city’s citizens. The externality tax works well in cases 
where the state is not entirely dedicated to welfare and best when it is. The smartest 
but again tedious way to go about preserving air quality or smoother traffic would 
be to revise the valuation of consumers and increase awareness.  
 
 What is most surprising is the compelling need that is felt to condense 
and inscribe in stone certain principles being used to serve our needs better, while 
this in itself drives them into a form of fundamentalism. This propensity for worship 
and religious belief, as conformism is known to be, can work the other way, 
restricting freedom of thought and liberal scholarship. Excessive use of theory, in 
principle or in measurement, is resorting to fundamentalism and the challenge 






  For example, this thesis is irrelevant and completely worthless if a state 
functions well and society is completely egalitarian and rational in decision-making, 
though strictly with payoffs as a determinant, again extreme and fantastical, and so 
is our marginality assumption, for cases of zero tolerance. To be honest, such a 
condition is not entirely as pleasing as it seems and irrationality does have a silver 
lining of its own, but we leave it aside for now. So the theoretical implications from 
it also apply under a set of preconditions, none of which are the extraordinary just 
to confirm again, and it could be subject to an identical or more extreme 
examination than it offers.  
 
  What does reduce the work load for planners, being typically inadequate, 
irrational and inept, is that the challenge of pursuing a certain narrow interest 
under a shadow of doubt is absent, or if present, will lead to further inefficiency 
whose costs are usually high in accordance with the hazard it bears. There is the 
cake and only the cake to deal with and this has to be done without any magic, a 
luxury only she enjoys and shares with us on a good day. That shouldn’t however 
stop them from probing further as there is certainly a need for maintaining the 
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